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Abstract 
This study attempts to provide a framework for understanding the role of the “embeddedness” in China’s 
economic success reflected by a unique embedded integration of state-market-society relations. “Embeddedness 
with Chinese characteristics” is the central concept of this study for analyzing how cultural and political 
uniqueness influences economic activities and shapes distinctive institutional forms. In order to grasp the factors 
behind the Chinese economic success, it is important to understand how the disembedded forces of marketization 
and commodification were balanced by the embedded forces of socio-cultural and political structures. These 
historically and culturally shaped structures, such as the active role of the state and local governments, the variety 
of forms of property and business ownership, the traditional culture of clientele-based social relations, etc., provide 
rich empirical context to explain and analyze the “embedded” hegemony in transitional China. The first part of the 
this paper provides a conceptual framework for understanding socio-cultural and political embeddedness in China 
and the second part analyzes some characteristics of the state-market-society embedded process during its 
economic development in the past decades. The conclusion is that China’s economic reform and success manifest 
a long and innovative grinding-in process of state-market-society relations.  
Keywords: embeddedness, Chinese characteristics, state-market relations, institutional clientism. 
1. The Chinese “Pazzel” and the Research Question 
The revolutionary and dramatic transformations in China in the 20th century qualify China to be an ideal “case 
study” for scientific research of political, economic and social change and development. Since the beginning of the 
last century, the world has witnessed theatrical changes in China’s social-political-economic structures: Politically, 
the Chinese state and society transformed from a regional hegemonic “Middle Kingdom” to a periphery country, 
from an imperial multi-ethnicity monarchy to a short-lived republic of quasi-nationalism, and from a disintegrated 
and contending warlordism to a centralized revolutionary socialist state. Economically, China leaped forward from 
an agrarian state directly to a socialist centrally-planned economy, and then returned to a market-oriented economy. 
Ideologically, the Chinese value systems underwent dramatic transformations from feudalism to socialism, from 
Marxism to capitalism, and from collectivism to individualism. In historical retrospect the country experienced 
repeated shifts from crisis and failure to very rapid growth and industrialization. 
One of the puzzling questions facing many scholars of social sciences and especially those who are engaged in 
Chinese studies is how to comprehend and interpret China’s historical transformations marked by fundamental 
changes, failures and successes in the past four decades (Harding, 1987; Dirlik & Meisner, 1989; Hinton, 1990; 
Weil, 1996, etc.). Many are bewildered by the fact that China’s increased economic privatization and 
marketization since the early 1990s has not triggered a simultaneous advance in political liberalization. Many 
studies have sought to explain why sources of social support for the political order have still remained sizeable, 
despite soaring problems in inequality, environmental decay, and corruption together with upsurge in popular 
unrest (Wang, 2003; Sausmikat, 2006; Zheng, 2009; Li & Christensen, 2010). In this connection, there are a 
number of related questions that need to be answered: what are the internal driving forces and the external 
influences behind these transformations? What are the important factors behind its economic success in moving 
the country from being an economy owned and controlled by the state (state socialism) to being one supervised and 
regulated by the state in combination with the market mechanisms (state capitalism)? How to conceptualize the 
role of the Chinese cultural and political embeddedness in attaining macro-policy independence and socio-political 
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stability? Since the mid-1990s, the world has witnessed the emergence of a self-confident and self-proclaimed 
economic development model - “market economy with Chinese characteristics” or “market socialism”. Today, 
China is depicted by the US-led world order both as a revisionist development model and as a revisionist emerging 
power that is aiming to change the existing order. 
Nowadays, it is not difficult to notice the fact that much of the mainstream China-centered literature and media 
coverage reveal a strong sentiment of “China syndrome” - a phenomenon of hysteria that can be characterized by a 
mixture of psychological anxiety, emotional panic and emphatic demonization. Throughout the last three decades, 
either fascination or irritation with China’s unpredictable development trajectory has influenced Western 
scholarship and journalism, which often produce abrupt sentiments ranging from excessive approval and 
unqualified optimism to unwarranted revulsion and deep pessimism. One of the fundamental reasons for the 
constant failure of the West in predicting China’s evolution and transformation is its failure to understand and 
interpret its past and present. 
1.1 Objective and Methodological Considerations 
Against the underlying assumptions of contemporary development and international relations theories that 
perceive a causal and lineal process of the Eurocentric modernization path driven by market, competition and 
technology, the paper intends to apply a combined interdisciplinary approach (political economy, political 
sociology, socio-cultural perspectives) to examine the unique characteristics of Chinese development since its 
economic reform in the late 1970s with a special focus on the relationship between transformations and 
embeddedness, i.e. how China is able to combine political, economic and socio-cultural innovations with the 
incorporation of market arrangements, the form of capitalist mode of production, and the role of state within that 
system. 
The paper aims at analyzing the dynamics of state-market-society relations in China over the last three decades and 
exploring the features of Chinese socio-cultural and political embeddedness in the process of marketizing 
decision-making power and commodifying institutions. The Chinese style of market economy is a distinct form of 
capitalism characterized by active state roles and close state-business relations. The emergence of new institutional 
entrepreneurs and their role in institutional innovations play a positive role in encouraging marketization and 
decentralization of state capacities and public resources without falling into economic and social disembeddedness. 
In other words, the Chinese reform process consciously neutralized and reduced the market dis-embedded forces 
by a deliberate injection of embeddedness in a nexus of social, political and economic relations. 
Theoretically and conceptually, the paper draws some inspirations from 1) Karl Polanyi (1957) and his insightful 
analysis on the transition from feudalism to capitalism, i.e. the phenomenon of the disembedded transformation 
from a “society with market” (pre-capitalist society) to a “market society” (capitalist society); 2) Talcott Parsons 
(1951) and his theory on social differentiation process in which a society transforms from a unified system 
(simplicity) into sub-systems (complexity); 3) David Wank (1999) and his theory of the Chinese “institutional 
clientism” in which China’s unique embedded process is realized and maintained through a dynamic 
state-market-society relationship. While Polanyi’s and Parson’s theories aim to explain the evolution of a society 
from a unified and embedded unity into multiple disembedded and differentiated entities, Wank intends to explore 
the incorporated and embedded relationships characterized by patron-client networks between state and market in 
China with a focus on the role of market clientelism for the dynamism of China’s economic development. 
2. The Dichotomy of “Embeddedness” and “Dis-embeddedness” 
The notion of “embeddedness” implies that individuals and institutions are engaged in ongoing social relations, 
and they cannot be understood as being independent from one another (Granovetter, 1985, p. 182). It is the central 
concept of this study for analyzing how cultural and political factors influence economic activities and shape 
distinctive institutional forms. The application of the “embeddedness” concept is primarily to distinguish its 
opposite concept – “disembeddedness”. 
The dichotomy of “embeddedness” and “dis-embeddedness” was conceptually derived from Polanyi’s economic 
anthropology. According to Polanyi’s thesis, the capitalist mode of production is very different from all preceding 
ways of organizing material life and social reproduction in which reciprocity (unenforced gift-giving), 
redistribution (of common wealth), and house-holding (familial autarchy) provided social foundations for 
economic structures, small and large, poor and wealthy alike (Polanyi, 1957, pp. 48-55). In line with Polanyi’s 
understanding, the transition of human society to market economy was a dual disembedded process: (1) the 
predominance of transactions and social interactions that are not submerged in social relationships but are based on 
economic self-interest; and (2) the absence of social control over the economic process of production and 
distribution (Vančura, 2011). Disembeddedness implies that economic relations (actors and institutions) are 
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separated from non-economic relations – a distinction between a society with market and a market society (Polanyi, 
1957). The former refers to the fact that before the establishment of the capitalist mode of production, markets 
existed and played a complementary role in corresponding to the dominant economy with exchange of 
supplementary goods. Under the pre-capitalist socio-economic pattern of society, social relationship always 
prevailed over economic logic. The latter entails that society itself becomes an “adjunct” of the market, and a 
market economy can exist only in a market society because in such a society social relations are embedded in 
economy rather than an economy embedded in social relations (Wood, 1999).  
A free market economy is an economic system directed, controlled and regulated by the market mechanism alone. 
All values are economically-based and nothing exists outside the free market framework. Order within the market 
system is maintained through the so-called self-regulating market mechanism that derives from the expectations 
that each individual is driven to pursue his/her own self-interest. Labor, land and environment are viewed as 
tradable goods and human beings are commodified as producers and consumers. Freedom is reduced to the right to 
choose among competing alternatives, and progress is assessed in terms of economic growth and wealth collection. 
When market exchange becomes central to modern forms of economic organization, market rationality and 
calculation unavoidably determines modern ways of understanding and interpreting economic action and 
motivation. In this way, a market society is characterized by the “disembeddness” of market forces from a wider 
context of social relations, norms and institutions. Economic behavior is thus isolated as a discrete type of social 
action, governed by market logic, and based on impersonal transactions between buyer and seller. On the contrary, 
the concept of “embeddedness” refers to the extent to which economic rationality and practice is constrained by 
non-economic institutions. In other words, it denotes that socio-cultural and socio-political factors play a vital role 
in influencing economic activities and shaping distinctive institutional forms. 
2.1 Social and Structural Differentiation  
Parsons’ theory of social evolution (1957) sees the process of social differentiation as involving three stages - a 
process of differentiation; a process of adaptation and reintegration, and a process of a more general system of 
values which holds the more complex society together. The theory explains the increased process of 
system/structural differentiation of modern society as a way of responding to the increased complexity of its 
environment. The constant creation of subsystems deals with such an increased complexity. Each subsystem is 
also interactively connected with other subsystems.  
Structural differentiation explains that the development of every society has to pass a process through which a 
unified social system is structurally differentiated into specialized subsystems, such as economy, religion, politics, 
and law. The formation of subsystems is an imperative consequence of responding to the differentiations in 
connection with the changing environment. As a result, a social system becomes more and more complex with 
each subsystem interacting with other subsystems (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. The differentiation of social system  
 
When a functionally unified social system is divided into subsystems, its integrated legitimation and 
problem-solving means and mechanisms also become separated into subsystems (see Figure 1). Each subsystem is 
not able to independently generate the previous unified legitimation, and hence it has to receive “contributions” 
from other subsystems. Each subsystem is also specialized in the production of certain general values, but it does 
not determine how these values are to be used by other subsystems. For example, the profit and surplus value (the 
market law) can be used in a number of ways. But it has to depend on the “inputs” from other subsystems through 
an interchange of relationship, e.g. from polity (coercion) and socio-cultural norms (consent). Seen from the 
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perspectives of Parsons’ theory on social evolution (1951), when the legitimation of a social system (equilibrium) 
becomes dependent on the subsystem’s output, the maintenance of legitimation needs new adaptive mechanisms 
of integration, coordination and control in order to incorporate the “contributions” from the other subsystems. 
The Chinese marketization process clearly verifies a similar process and effect of social and structural 
differentiation in which China transformed from a society of a highly unified system (unified legitimacy and value 
system) to a post-reform society of differentiated and divided subsystems with each subsystem generating its own 
systems of legitimacy and value. The pre-reform embedded “unity” was maintained by an authoritarian political 
system and a socialist political economy through: 
(1) a centrally-planned economy characterized by cooperative and state (public) ownership and control of the 
means of production and distribution;  
(2) a centrally planned allocation of society’s resources;  
(3) a universal elimination of economic and political inequalities and class privileges;  
(4) a full utilization of human potentials and the dominance of the interest of the immediate producers at the 
workplace and of working people in all spheres of society;  
(5) a centralized line of politics and ideology in command;  
(6) a populist and egalitarian welfare and social security system. 
 
The differentiation of the unified social system in the aftermath of the post-Mao economic reform period was a 
causal consequence of the economic reform policies that gave full play to market disembedded mechanisms. The 
reform policies included privatization of ownership and the means of production and distribution; marketization of 
resource allocation; acceptance of economic inequality and capital privilege; emphasis on science and technology 
as the essential productive forces; promotion of professional and entrepreneur classes; and commodification of 
welfare and social security. However, at the same time there were also strong embedded forces by historically 
shaped structures, such as the active role of the Chinese party-state and local governments, the adaptive political 
and ideological “sinicization”, the various forms of property and business ownership, the traditional culture of 
guanxi and clientele-based social relations. The constant struggles between forces of embeddedness and 
disembeddedness symbolized a process of socio-political transformation in which economic practices taken by 
individuals and institutions were largely refracted by socio-political relations within which they function. 
Therefore, to understand how cultural and political factors influence economic activities and shape distinctive 
institutional forms, one has to understand the features of China’s historical and socio-political structure. 
3. Socio-Cultural Embeddedness 
There is a consensus among scholars of China studies that China is not a nation-state, it is fundamentally a 
civilization state (Pye, 1990; Jacques, 2011). It is important to understand the fact that the Chinese sense of identity 
– China’s sense of being China and the Chinese sense of being Chinese - comes from its long history as a 
“civilization state.” Such a historically unique identity has shaped a distinctive notion of the state, family, social 
relationship (guanxi). Thus, it is paradoxical to apply the Western “nation state” concept and unit of analysis to 
analyze China, a concept that has its historical root in the formation of the modem nation-state system in Europe. 
The most important value of Chinese political culture throughout its centuries of civilization is cultural and 
political unity and the maintenance of the Chinese civilization. 
The English word “country” in the Chinese language consists of two words “国家” (Guo Jia), i.e. Guo refers to 
“state” and Jia refers to “family”. This explains that historically, politically and culturally, the Chinese “state” – as 
a socio-political structure - has been defined and governed under a two-polar system, i.e. at the very top it is the 
state (the ruler) and government, while at the bottom it is the family (the basis social unit). Rights, obligations, 
roles and responsibilities at both levels are supposed to be clearly defined and understood. Such a system is 
ideologically maintained by Confucianism - China’s central philosophical and value architecture. The Confucian 
teachings on “reign and rule in a kingly way” (王道) for the top, while “loyalty and filial piety” (忠孝) for the 
bottom play a vital role in defining interactive relationships between the state, family and individual. Here, it is 
important to notice that the middle layer between the state and family – the “society” or “civil society” – is missing 
(see Figure 2 below). 
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 Figure 2. China’s historical and traditional two-layer structure 
 
It is believed that the lack of a dynamic middle layer of “society” and the set of Confucian ethics and value system, 
which emphasizes the group over the individual, authority over liberty and responsibilities over rights, weakens 
the development of individual awareness and provides no legitimacy for autonomous social institutions. In 
contrast, the historically evolved strong and vibrant middle layer of civil society in the West, together with a 
number of others socio-cultural and socio-political features, is seen as being “unique”, but not “universal” 
(Huntington, 1996). Seen from the Weberian culturalist perspectives, the Chinese family-based social structure 
and the Confucian value system were not able to breed capitalist economic orientation and organization; and the 
rise of market capitalism in Europe was an outcome of unique cultural phenomena and institutional development 
which found their clearest expression in the capitalist economy (Weber, 1958, 1968). 
Historically, the sustainability of the Chinese social system was built on loyalty to the state on the one hand, and 
filial piety to the family on the other (Figure 2), which made the political patriarchy and patrimonialism possible. 
Under this type of socio-political formation, the middle space between the state and family, namely society, was 
invisible. China’s two-layer socio-political structure (state-family) is very different from the Western three-layer 
structure (state-civil society-individual). This is why many western political and democracy theories cannot be 
fully applied in analyzing and understanding Chinese cases because many of the theoretical assumptions and 
foundations are derived from the development of civil society and middle class and are based on the origins present 
in Western historical experiences. For example, the Gramscian “hegemony” theory defines the state as force plus 
consent, and sees hegemony as an ideal combination of political society (state) that organizes force, and civil 
society that provides consent (Gramsci, 1971, p. 263). In other words, historically, China does not have the 
tradition and does not have a middle space “society” where a complex of attitudes, values, and institutions that are 
amalgamated and reified under the term “civil society”. 
Dialectically, seen from a different but a positive perspective in support of the paper’s argument, the lack of a 
“society” layer was a fortune rather than misfortune in the way that the damages and costs of differentiation and 
disembeddedness brought about by the economic marketization process were painfully absorbed and digested by 
families and social networks without creating a heavy “societal burden” that could lead to social unrest and 
political disorder. Traditionally, the family, the extended families and the kinship-based social relationships 
functioned as the source of welfare and employment for members who needed assistance in times of trouble and 
disability. The role of the state used to maintain a peaceful and stable environment for the functioning of 
family-centered welfare and employment structure. Even during the socialist period when the state invested 
heavily to build up a public social security and welfare system, there was still a dual track of welfare structure. 
According to Titmuss’ formulation, such a dual track was based on an institutional approach for the state sectors 
and the urban populations in terms of medical care and pensions, and a residual approach for the rural areas where 
State
No clear concept 
of society
Family and individual
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social resources were allocated only when family and the market failed to make the delivery (Titmuss in Selden & 
You, 1997). 
 The Chinese family structure together with the deep-seated Confucian value systems played a vital role in 
absorbing or lessening the pressure brought about by the differentiation and disembedded consequences of the 
marketization process, such as free prices, the removal of subsidies, the opening up of economies to international 
trade, freely convertible currencies, privatization of the state-owned companies, absorbing foreign investment, 
closing inefficient enterprises and laying off of redundant workers. Fortunately, China’s strong traditional cultural 
values were able to balance, to a certain extent, the forces of “disembeddedness” by the economic marketization 
and commodification process. The cultural and social embeddedness of economic practice was particularly 
important during China’s early reform periods when new institutions were being formed to serve and comply with 
the market forces.  
Chinese families were also one of the country’s core economic actors during the reform period. Many of the small- 
and medium-sized enterprises, which were also called Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs), were 
family-based businesses. TVEs became a major driving force in the 1980s and 1990s in contributing to economic 
growth, creating employment and optimizing economic structure (Putterman, 1997; and Fu and Balasubramanyam, 
2010). TVEs were largely seen as one of the most successful factors in the country’s transition to a market 
economy. The majority of jobs in the country’s rural areas were provided by these enterprises, which played a vital 
role in reducing the employment pressure and maintaining social stability. The contribution of the role of 
family-based enterprises has been clearly recognized by the Chinese government: 
According to statistics, 99 percent of Chinese enterprises are small- and medium-sized, which at present provides 
jobs for 75 percent of the country’s employed, produces more than 60 percent of exports, and creates 45 percent of 
national tax revenue, 70 percent of increased industrial output and more than 55 percent of the gross domestic 
product. … 
It should be stressed that small- and medium-sized enterprises have become fundamental to reducing employment 
pressure and maintaining social stability. The absolute majority of jobs in the country’s rural areas are provided by 
small- and medium-sized enterprises, especially township enterprises. (China Questions and Answers, 
China.org.cn) 
“Social connections” or “social networks” lie at the heart of China’s socio-political order, its economic structure, 
and its changing institutional landscape. They reflect cultural and social conventions, norms, values and beliefs 
that can be translated into socio-cultural “embeddedness” in shaping China’s economic performance (Thomas, et 
al., 2002). They are a useful analytical tool through which we can understand cultural embeddedness in the 
institutions–performance connection as well as the complex interweaving of cultural traditions and economic 
practices. To conceptualize the nexus between Chinese business practices and their social foundations is a good 
approach to understanding institutional foundation for economic transactions in Chinese business settings. As 
Chung and Hamilton point out, 
The logic of social relationships - or what we call guanxi logic - is embedded in daily practices of the Chinese 
business community. Rather than making economic decisions less “economic”, relational rules embedded in 
guanxi places interpersonal business transactions within a prescriptive framework, thereby increasing the 
calculability of economic outcomes. Guanxi logic is, therefore, a socially meaningful way to enhance economic 
rationality. (Chung & Hamilton, 2001, p. 325) 
4. Political Embeddedness 
For centuries, the Chinese state has been enjoying overwhelming authority, and the state is seen as the 
representative, the embodiment, the guardian of the Chinese civilization. In contrast to Western history, the power 
of the Chinese state has not been seriously challenged by rivals (aristocracies, churches, capitals, merchants, etc.). 
The Chinese views on the state are very different from those of the West in the way that the state is seen not only as 
the defender of the Chinese civilization but also as the patriarch, the head of family. The state’s “natural authority” 
is embedded in the cultural consciousness of Chinese people.  
In the contemporary context, it is not unusual that the Chinese state, in its dual capacity of being both a political 
and economic actor, plays a “guardian role” in economic development and in the market. The state is everywhere 
in the market, and the state firms are the main driving forces and key internal and external players (Li and Shaw, 
2013), while private firms depend on state patronage. China has a long history of state-led development project, 
such as the Grand Canal since the 5th century BC (a historical symbol of a state-led infrastructural project). 
According to the concrete evidences by some studies, “China’s and political institutions were imbricated in the 
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market-development project. The state, especially local (province-level and below) state bureaus, became focused 
on economic development and was deeply involved in private-sector activities” (Haveman, et al. 2014, p. 39). 
Political embeddedness not only played an indispensable role in nurturing the emergence of sustainable markets, 
but also became entrenched in the institutional architecture of the business system of China (Krug, 2012). At the 
concrete business level, political embeddedness “incorporates personal links that bind private capital holders to the 
party-state through connections that are layered with reciprocal affective components. Such close relations work 
against the potential interest that private capital holders might have in leading or joining efforts to press for 
fundamental political liberalization” (McNally & Wright, 2010, p. 189). 
Political embeddedness implies a continuous “Sinicization” process. The notion of Sinicization entails a 
spontaneous process of absorbing new or foreign ideas while forcing them to be mixed with and embedded into 
Chinese native practices (Li, 2004; Li & Shaw, 2013). Sinicization is expressed in two important ways in today’s 
China: policy consistency and ideological/theoretical modification. It secures the stability of state policy and 
regulation and the access to state-controlled resources, which is highly conducive and rewarding to politically 
embedded companies in competitive markets (Haveman, et al. 2014). Externally, political embeddedness in terms 
of policy regulation strengthens China’s competition in the regional and global market and, while internally, it 
ensures unity and stability in a path-dependent economic development - a new economic order is derived from 
balancing embeddedness and disembeddedness with the remains of the old one. 
Political embeddedness in terms of ideological modification refers to a “Sinicizing” process of transforming ideas 
and concepts into Chinese-like ones or to change or modify them by Chinese influence (Li & Christensen, 2010). 
The Chinese reform politics understand the great importance of promoting market capitalism without cognitive 
disconnection with the heritage of its political legitimacy of the existing order. One way to achieve political 
embeddedness is to apply the “framing power”. The “framing power” refers to the capacity of defining and 
redefining ideas, concepts, discourse, and rhetoric which bear policy implication, and which reflect ideological and 
institutional adaptation. This is because political discourses represent not only a way of expressing viewpoints but 
also a weapon to legitimize changes as the way they are meant to be (Li and Christensen, ibid.). Figure 3 below 
shows the historical process of ideological and political sinicization or internalization in China from the way that 
Chinese Marxism, Mao Zedong thought, and socialism emerged and developed, and that their concepts have been 
elaborated and employed, to the way that Dengist capitalism was developed and regulated, and that new political 
discourses needed to be invented in order to cope with emerging problems.  
Figure 3 below implies that the power transition process of the Chinese leadership has been characterized by the 
emphasis in continuity in fundamental political and ideological principles, policy coherence and elite politics. It 
also entails that certain “amendments” (CCP’s internal struggles) are necessary in order to address the problems 
from the previous leadership and to respond to the emerging challenges faced by the current leadership. The “Deng 
Xiaoping theory” can be understood as an attempt to amend the rigid period of Maoist socialism and socialist plan 
economy, while the “Three Representative” under Jiang Zeming’s leadership aimed to cooptate the rise of various 
kinds of capitalist class brought about by Deng Xiaoping’s “development-at-any-cost” policy. The “Harmonious 
Society” and “Scientific Development” ideas by the Hu Jintao Administration were designed to cope with the 
problems created by the pro-capital policy of the previous leaderships, which led to rampant inequality, corruption 
and environmental decay. The current “Chinese Dream” politics attempted to address the questions concerning 
which direction China is going and to reconstruct a new hegemony at the levels of language, social relations, 
politics and practice, societal development and national consciousness (Li, 2015). 
 
 
Figure 3. Political embeddedness in the nexus between policy necessity and ideological modification 
 
Political reform toward democratization was seen to be necessary; however, it was not understood as power 
differentiation and decentralization shaped by the Western style of representative and electoral democracy. Rather, 
it was defined in narrow and technical terms, referring to the implementation of measures that aimed to improve 
www.ccsenet.org/ach Asian Culture and History Vol. 8, No. 2; 2016 
25 
the efficiency of the government and mobilize resources in order to let economic reform move forward. In the 
course of managing the transformations brought about by the economic liberalization process, political 
embeddedness ensures the role of the state as a proactive player – an initiator, a planner, an organizer – in the 
capacity of being both a policy-maker and policy-implementer. The resilient nature of the Chinese political 
embeddedness implies that as long as the state is transforming and adapting itself in accordance with China’s 
socio-economic changes, the basic structure of its dominion over the market and society will not be fundamentally 
altered (Zheng, 2009). 
The economic reform, one the one hand, implies a necessity to reorganize society, but it can also, on the other hand, 
imply that a breakthrough in establishing a new order is not necessarily the outcome of the final collapse of the old 
one. Rather, it is an outcome of social reorganization initiated or imposed by a dominant political force or a 
coalition of forces. Social reorganization can be realized through passive revolution in which the survival of an 
existing order, albeit the emergence of a crisis, is made possible by the absorption of social contradictions which 
are not necessarily resolved, but are contained or transformed into new forms of relations (Li & Christensen, 
2010). 
The main course of the Chinese economic reform has been implemented with many sub- or mini-processes of 
“political fittings”. “Political fittings” refers to the fact that the Chinese party-state is struggling to adapt itself or to 
enforce itself to respond or to adjust to the disembeddedness pressure from both the domestic and transnational 
market forces. In other words, China’s post-Mao leadership undertook a modernization process through sinicizing 
Western market capitalism and incorporating “Chinese characteristics” without disembedding its political 
imperativeness and socio-cultural stamps. Beijing has been struggling to construct an awkward mixture of 
combining cultural and political logos (Chinese characteristics) and market forces (law of value). “Political fittings” 
characterized by “Sinicizing adaptations” has been a historical phenomenon since the emergence of the Chinese 
Communist Party led by Mao Zedong. Each new generation of political leadership had to resolve the problem 
heritage from the previous one through reconstructing a new hegemony at the levels of language, social relations, 
politics and practice, societal development, people’s consciousness, and even morality. 
4.1 State-market Embeddedness 
Being the first case of rapid industrialization outside the Western cultural and geographical spheres, the 
remarkable success of Japan and the East Asian newly industrialized economies (NIEs) became the object of 
various academic studies and interpretations in the 1980s and 1990s (Wade, 1990; Chan, 1990, Lee, 1993; Li 
1995). In 1993, The World Bank published a special report on The East Asian Miracle (World Bank, 1993) in 
which the role of East Asian states was seen as playing positive and market-friendly roles in promoting economic 
development. This World Bank report generated a global debate on the various factors behind the East Asian 
success, leading to the emergence of various literature on exploring the East Asian economic success from the 
perspectives of state-market relations. China’s economic success was generally considered as a continuation of the 
success stories of Japan and East Asian NIEs. 
There is much existing literature on the topic of Chinese state-market embeddedness, such as McNally and Wright 
(2010), that examines the nature and implications of the political embeddedness of China’s private capital holders. 
The Chinese embeddedness can also be applied in the previous discussion on East Asian “developmental state”, 
which is a highly useful concept in understanding the interactive social relations between economic actors and 
institutional agents. 
4.2 The Chinese Developmental State 
As said, the Chinese economic development experience can also be explained by referring to the core features of 
the East Asian economic development paradigm of what Chalmers Johnson calls the “Capitalist Developmental 
State” (Johnson, 1982, 1995). China’s economic catching-up strategies clearly resembled the East Asian 
experiences: building on a strong authoritarian leadership and an elite bureaucracy pursuing developmentally 
oriented policies, including the direct role of the state in governing the market. In the 1990s, there were plenty of 
literature on the themes of the newly industrializing countries in East Asia, such as Evans, Peter (1995), Haggard, 
Stephan (1990), Wade, Robert (1990), Weiss, Linda & Hobson, John M. (1995), Woo-Cumings, Meredith (1999), 
etc. Through a similar analytical lens, China’s success in the last three decades of economic reform can be 
understood as having been led by a strong and pro-development state that is capable of shaping national consensus 
on maintaining overall political and macroeconomic stability in order to pursue wide-ranging economic 
modernization. Like those of the East Asian development states, there are a few unique features of the Chinese 
developmental state (CDS) that have fostered the embedded relations between the state and the market: 
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1) The CDS sees economic development as the over-arching objective of the state. It struggles to maintain 
socio-political stability and to keep a manageable equality in distribution in order to prevent crisis between 
capitalist accumulation and class/sectoral exploitation. It plays a leading role in fostering, guiding and ensuring 
economic growth and technological modernization over the long-term. 
2) The CDS puts forward national development goals and standards that are internationally-oriented and that are 
based on non-ideological external referents. It is eager to absorb worldwide development experiences without 
abandoning its own policy-making sovereignty as to when, where and how to adopt foreign ideas and practices. 
The state is determined to plan an active role in financial control over the economy even in face of international 
pressure to liberalize its financial sectors. 
3) The CDS sets up an infrastructure of productive forces and labor markets which target the global market so that 
its export-oriented economic growth is sustainable on a long-term basis. Its national education system is also 
designed to serve the economic growth and overseas market. 
4) The CDS initiates state-driven industrial policies with macro national planning and national goals. It recognizes 
and empowers bureaucratic elites capable of administering the system and decision-making without being 
subjected to political influence by various interest groups so that it can function professionally and independently. 
On the other hand, economic policy-making processes involve close government-business collaborations in order 
to correctly respond to market signals with policy adjustment. 
5) The CDS believes that free market transactions need explicit “administrative guidance” and “directed credit” to 
pick up the winners or prioritize some industries over others. State and private sectors are promoted to work 
together to pursue economic goals. Government not only regulates business enterprises but also assists them with 
overheads and other preferential policies. It channels foreign direct investment to target strategic private 
businesses while business enterprises assist the government to reach social and economic objectives. 
6) The CDS does not allow liberal ideologies to confuse the national consensus and does not permit the 
development of political pluralism that might challenge its goals. It does not see Western democracy as a political 
system on its own that will necessarily lead to economic and social development. It believes that what a country needs 
at its initial developmental stage is discipline more than democracy. 
In other words, the state or other organizations representing the public interest always try to operate and regulate 
the free market economy. This type of state-market relations, seen from the Polanyian perspectives, makes the 
Chinese market-driven economy “re-embed” itself in the Chinese society and subordinate itself to the Chinese 
socio-cultural and socio-political realities. The positive outcome is that, as one study correctly points out, “China’s 
capitalists appear to have little interest in pushing for systemic political reforms, but instead seem to seek to embed 
themselves in the party-state, thereby perpetuating Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule” (McNally and Wright, 
2010, p. 189) 
5. Empirical Findings 
This study finds a great deal of empirical support to its central thesis on the role of embeddedness in China’s 
economic success from David Wank (2001), who provides a framework for understanding the embedded Chinese 
state-market relations in which the previous political power by “politics in command” is commodified to 
accommodate and negotiate with the market power by “economics in command”. One of his theoretical angles is 
institutional clientism, which offers a good analytical tool to examine China’s unique state-market-society 
embedding process through the lens of patron-client ties between entrepreneurs operating private firms, and 
officials staffing the state administrative, distributive and production institutions. This “matching” is realized and 
maintained through a dynamic relationship, neither strictly political nor purely economic in character. 
Wank’s contextually rich and intellectually incisive studies were based upon almost two years of his ethnographic 
fieldwork in one of the economic zones in Xiamen City, Fujian Province. It was one of China’s five special 
economic zones, from which he conducted a close examination on the distinctive features of the interactive 
relations between private business and the state at the local levels. On the basis of his empirical field studies, he 
developed an interesting conception which he calls “the institutional commodification account”. In the first part of 
his Commodifying Communism, Wank described the nature of business in the late 1980s in Xiamen, a southern 
coastal city that was designated a Special Economic Zone. The focus of this section of the book is a detailed 
description of how private business operated and the role that networks of social and political relations played in 
shaping these operations. In the second part of this book, the author speculates about the implications of these 
relations for various political and economic outcomes. The book compares China's economic performance since 
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the implementation of reform with the performance in other transition economies, and he speculates about the role 
that different social, cultural and political structures played in creating these differences. 
Wank’s analytical framework for understanding China’s dynamics in state-market-society relations over the last 
three decades examines how the embedded dynamics were generated in the process of China’s market transition. 
What is important is to find the unique features of embeddedness of Chinese socio-cultural and political adaptation 
through marketizing decision-making powers and commodifying state institutions and distribution mechanisms. 
Wank’s book shows in great detail the state-market embedded process of interweaving the various forms of 
co-operation between the public and the private: “the co-operatives”, where the “patronage” and the site were 
provided by the local government while the capital came from private entrepreneurs; and “the co-enterprises”, in 
which the “public status” was bestowed by the SOE and the funds were private; as well as “leasing” (particularly of 
hotels and restaurants) to private operators, etc. 
The conceptual strength of David Wank’s work lies in the fact that his notion of “institutional clientism”, based on 
his ethnographic study of the role of personal-social ties between private entrepreneurs and local officials, explains 
vitality and dynamics behind the success of the re-organization of China’s emerging market economy. An 
underlying question that Wank intends to answer in his book is: how does a market economy emerge from a 
communist system? In connection with China, this question is quite specific: how can the emergence of market 
mechanisms and state political logic coexist and interact? His analysis finds that the resurgence of private 
enterprise as an outcome of the economic marketization does not lead to any weakening of the patron/client 
relationship as neoliberal theories would imagine, but rather to the emergence of new, more commercialized or 
cash-based forms of clientelism – a distinctive feature of “a market economy with Chinese characteristics.”  
5.1 Empirical Reflections: Institutional Clientism  
As a strong empirical support for this paper’s core thesis, the accounts of Wank’s empirical findings can be 
synthesized into a framework of understanding China’s unique state-market relations: 
• Institutional clientism implies the transformation of institutionalized social relations from monopoly to 
marketization of the country’s resources, either through an official’s position or through clientist ties between 
private actors and office-holders. It is an integrating process in which policy-making and controlling power of 
state institutions are incorporated into economic calculations and business promotions that reflect market 
commodification values.  
• Government policies and decision-making rationalities on resource allocation are integrated into market 
competition logic, but nevertheless are centered on personal or network relations including private businesses 
that seek to benefit from government policies and have a share of these resources. The state’s previous 
monopoly is replaced with new regulatory monopolies facilitating while constraining market interactions 
such as licensing, quota allocations, etc. This type of state-market clientist relations can promote efficiency in 
an emerging market because it permits long-term relationship rather than short-term calculation. 
• Institutional clientism entails a reconfiguration process in which government politics are more directed 
toward market competitive ends. However, due to the fact that “social action reflects the evolutionary 
systemic (macro) constraints as well as the individuated (micro) constraints of personal history and status” 
(Wank, ibid., p. 30), the new market system cannot delink itself entirely from the old system in which the old 
legacies both create and constrain processes of cooperation and competition. This is because institutions are 
not neutral and they are culturally and socially conditioned.  
• Based on an institutional architecture of social trust, the new clientelist relations promote state-market 
cooperation and avoid an either-or situation: either the politics politicize the market or the market marketizes 
the politics. In other words, the market itself has no objection to politics as long as it cooperates with the 
market mechanism. However, the emphasis is placed on the maintenance of social order and political 
predictability, and such expectation has to be incorporated into market interactions. 
• The patron-client relationships embedded in the institutional clientism are based on social trust that reflects 
the interests of both sides; private businesses are keen on their ties with officialdom. In this type of 
relationship, “power is embodied not only in the monetary gains derived from trade but also in position in 
network. Diffuse forms of social, symbolic, and cultural capital shape relative resources and outcomes in 
interpersonal bargaining” (ibid.: 31). To do business is understood not solely as utility-maximizing in market 
transactions but as cultivating the personal and social relations (Guanxi). 
• Since the patron-client relationships are based on social trust that reflects the interests of both sides, private 
business is keen on its ties with officialdom. In this type of relationship, “power is embodied not only in the 
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monetary gains derived from trade but also in position in a network. Diffuse forms of social, symbolic, and 
cultural capital shape relative resources and outcomes in interpersonal bargaining” (Wank, 1999, p. 31). To 
do business is understood not solely as utility-maximizing in market transactions but as cultivating the 
personal and social relations (in Chinese “Guanxi”). The Chinese party-state likes to dine and dance with 
private business so that it is able to continue to control the politics while becoming enriched and strengthened 
by the market. 
• The public-private clientelism unveils that formal legal property rights and the definitions of an individual 
entrepreneur are less important than the “social environment” in determining the outcomes of business 
activity and market performance. In other words, having a good relationship with local Party and state 
officials is much more central for securing successful business than the formal ownership classification of 
that enterprise. Commercial rationality in China is less determined by relying on market opportunities than by 
cultivating strong ties with “Guanxi” that in turn will facilitate those market opportunities. 
 
These characteristics of “network or relational capitalism” (Boisot & Child, 1996) have given the Chinese state 
two advantages. The first is that the market reform has not brought about politically independent social forces and 
autonomous business interest groups which can challenge the state’s power. Although private economies have 
become one of the main sources of government revenue, the entrepreneurial classes still reply on the political and 
institutional environment to survive and prosper, and they still need the state’s protection to solve their disputes 
and conflicts with other subordinate classes as well as to reduce their social vulnerability and precariousness. The 
second is that the emergence of private enterprises in reforming China’s socialist command economy has not 
reduced the embeddedness of organizational decision-making, but rather it has spawned the development of new 
forms of embeddedness. It demonstrates the institutionalization of a symbiotic relationship between private 
business and government officialdom as the communist system transforms into a market economy.  
The application of Wank’s analytical findings intends to challenge not only the classical economic understanding 
of an ideal-typical, property-rights-based and legally bounded market image, but also the mainstream social and 
cultural economic perception in which the market can be socially and culturally patterned. The social 
embeddedness of private economic practices and institutional behavior has become the core point of departure in 
economic sociology. Seen from the perspectives of conventional theories of economic society, it is understandable 
that business transaction in China has been traditionally embedded in complex networks of social relations which 
reflect interpersonal and intercorporate ties. This study argues that the Chinese unique set of inter-business and 
market-government relations is creating embedded symbiosis.  
6. Conclusion  
There is a never-ending debate on state-market-society relations in development studies. The relationships 
between them are so inherently dialectical that forces of embeddedness and forces of disembeddedness create 
intrinsic dilemmas of reconciling market, society and state in a capitalist economy. Economic development is 
sometimes seen as being determined by how the problems are solved in the interactions between state, market and 
society. Different schools of thought put different emphases on dealing with these relational predicaments. 
The post-Mao Chinese reform experience reveals a constant “challenge-response” process between forces of 
modernization and marketization (differentiation and disembeddedness) and forces of socio-cultural and 
socio-political integration (adaptation and embeddedness). The Chinese success shows that China has been 
struggling to reduce, to a certain extent, the destructive effect of Polanyi’s “market society” phenomenon --- a 
wholesale “disembeddedness” of market relations from a wider social context --- for instance, contract-based 
market economy overlaps with customary forms of kinship exchange via trust networks of horizontal associations 
of personal relations (guanxi relations). Social networks, relations of trust, cultural traditions, shared ethnicity, 
informal norms, etc, facilitate and regulate economic exchange to various degrees. Social networks are neither 
simply social, nor strictly economic in character. In various ways, non-market exchanges (such as gift exchanges) 
can involve degrees of market-oriented calculation, such as calculations of equivalence, utility and value.  
This research posits that the rise of a Chinese style of capitalism is a long dialectical process of struggles between 
the forces of disembeddedness, such as the market impact and transnational capital, and the forces of 
embeddedness, such as the role of politics and historical and cultural structures. The evidence by the author’s own 
studies and especially by David Wank’s research findings demonstrate that the emergence of private enterprises in 
reforming the Chinese socialist economy did not reduce the embeddedness of organizational decision-making, but 
rather it spawned the development of new forms of embeddedness. The Chinese experience demonstrates the 
institutionalization of a symbiotic relationship between private business and government officialdom as the 
www.ccsenet.org/ach Asian Culture and History Vol. 8, No. 2; 2016 
29 
communist system transforms into a market economy. Institutional clientelism played an embedded role in 
unleashing the dynamism of China’s emerging market economy 
The author argues that China’s economic achievement is moulded by the “Chinese characteristics”, i.e. the 
cooptation of market forces (private sector) by political “passive revolution.” The transition from the previous 
“politics in command” to the current “economics in command” went hand in hand with the emergence of new 
“historical blocs” (social networks between the state and market) that are the bases of the production and 
reproduction of the market, trust and politics. The Chinese party-state is making politics a positive practice for 
entrepreneurs to align with while, at the same time, its legitimacy is consolidated through an active role in creating 
“embeddedness” in economic development. Such deliberate embeddedness is realized through a state-directed 
“framing” process in which intentional and planned policy-makings based on social and political concerns are 
injected into the market liberalization process.  
The Chinese case suggests that economic action and rationality is guided and shaped by social relations and 
political structures in complex and contingent ways. The author concludes that the Chinese economic success 
characterized by a Chinese style of capitalism reflects a series of embedded adaptations in cultural norms and 
practices, in institutional structures, in internalized rules and in political frameworks. The Chinese success shows 
that the transition and transformation process from Polanyi’s “society with market” to “market society” must be 
instituted, regulated and reproduced via a range of social networks, ideas and practices.  
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Notes 
Note 1. For many years, one of the author’s research focuses has been on China’s dramatic socio-economic and 
socio-political transformations and its development trajectory in the past decades. About 20 years ago, the author 
did his PhD dissertation on The Yin and Yang Behind China’s Transformation: A dialectical assessment of the 
Chinese revolutions from Mao to Deng (unpublished). The aim of the dissertation was to offer an open-handed 
conceptualization for interpreting China’s transformation from Maoist socialism to Dengist capitalism, and to 
provide a framework for understanding important issues concerning the Chinese Revolution, Chinese socialism 
as well as the on-going economic marketization process. Especially the ideological transformations taking place 
in China from feudalism to socialism, from Marxism to capitalism, and from collectivism to individualism were 
studied by the author, who published a number of articles on the topics related to Chinese socialism (1999a) and 
Chinese welfare reform (1999b). 
Note 2. The wording of “capitalism” as a socio-economic system is seen by the Chinese party-state as being 
politically incorrect and unacceptable in formal and official Chinese contexts. Therefore, expressions such as 
“socialist market economy” and “market socialism” are officially applied in China. 
Note 3. David Wank is Professor at The Faculty of Liberal Arts, Sophia University, Japan. He uses ethnographic 
and historical data to address sociological questions of state and society in China. He has been working on 
culture industries in China and the United States, and the global rise of China. In 1999, he published 
Commodifying Communism: Business, Trust, and Politics in a Chinese City. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. This book is based on his fieldwork in China in the early 1980s, and his research aimed to discern the 
political consequences of emerging markets for transitional communist states and societies such as China. The 
great contribution of David Wank’s research, seen from the author’s viewpoint, lies in the findings of his study 
on the embedded nexus in China’s economic reform process between the market, the social structure and 
political change. Later on, Wank also published an edited volume on Social Connections in China: Institutions, 
Culture, and the Changing Nature of Guanxi. New York: Cambridge, 2002. The book deals with the role of 
Chinese “Guanxi” (“social connections” or “social networks”) in business and social dealings in China today. 
Note 4. Guanxi means personal “relationship” and “connection”. In China, it is the right “Guanxi” that makes a 
big difference in ensuring successful business. By getting the right “Guanxi”, enterprises and institutions can 
minimize risks, frustrations, and disappointments when doing business in China. Acquiring the right “Guanxi” 
with the right people, the right network and the relevant authorities will determine a business’ competitiveness. 
Note 5. The term used by Gramsci refers to a process in which the bourgeoisie elite/class in advanced capitalist 
societies responds to an organic crisis by making necessary compromises and modifications as well as social 
reorganizations so as to re-establish its hegemony. 
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